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Abstract
In order to meet its obligations for prompt and sustained combat at sea, the US Navy relies on sailors
to perform relentlessly while underway in highly stressful combat environments. The Navy currently
uses an afloat staffing policy that is calculated using a 70-hour workweek per sailor metric. However,
this construct fails to factor in an individual sailor’s capacity to sustain performance and is based
instead on a notional Navy standard workweek. Part of the inadequacy of the current staffing policy
results from its failure to consider an inviolable and basic physiological requirement for
adequate sleep and rest for sailors. Research indicates a strong causal relationship between sleep
and performance. When deprived of sleep, either chronically or acutely, human performance suffers
in a dramatic and predictable manner. These performance decrements have even been equated to the
effects of alcohol. If the US Navy is to deliver the combat capability demanded by our government
and stated in Navy governing documents, sleep and rest requirements must be accounted for in
staffing methodologies. To achieve full combat capability, the Navy must change its culture and
adopt programs that promote crew endurance. Human system integration can provide a means to
accomplish this goal.
Background
In 1973, the US Navy transitioned from the
conscription force of the Vietnam era to an all-
volunteer force. A side effect of this change was
a reduction in force and a high turnover of Naval
personnel. Consequently, the Navy then experi-
enced a period in the mid- to late-1970s,
commonly referred to as the ‘‘Hollow Force,’’
characterized by deficiencies in manpower, tech-
nical skills, and leadership. Many believed that
this relatively inexperienced workforce was less
capable of delivering the combat requirements
demanded by our nation. In an effort to reverse
this trend, the Navy, under the direction of the
Reagan Administration, changed its overall
management strategy and personnel policies to
improve personnel retention. These changes re-
sulted in a more experienced workforce, as
measured by the force profile’s average length of
service. These actions had the desired effect: they
improved the Navy’s combat capability by
deploying a more experienced and capable
workforce and may have played a major role in
winning the ‘‘Cold War.’’
Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War and the absence of
an immediate naval threat, the US Navy has in-
stituted cost-cutting measures that may risk
creation of a second ‘‘Hollow Force.’’ The phys-
ical and cognitive attributes of sailors may well
represent our Navy’s greatest strength. However,
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these human attributes, if not properly managed,
can become weaknesses and must be accounted
for in the methodologies used to staff our afloat
platforms.
The current workload standard used by the Navy
for determining the afloat manpower require-
ments does not accurately reflect the sailor’s
ability to sustain performance while operating in
a wartime environment. This flaw, coupled with
efforts to reduce afloat manpower requirements
from the ‘‘M11 metric’’ to a ‘‘billets authorized is
good enough’’ construct, combines with optimal
manning initiatives to jeopardize the ability to
carry out the Navy’s wartime mission.
This paper addresses the immutable degrada-
tions in human performance due to chronic and
acute sleep deprivation and examines the role of
human performance in the staffing methodolo-
gies used by the US Navy. Additionally, we
address how the Navy’s operational culture may
further contribute to degraded performance by
sailors while they are at sea. Much of this infor-
mation is drawn from the large body of
empirical research focused on the relationship
between sleep requirements and human perfor-
mance. As in any military staffing methodology,
the desired end state is an effective war fighting
machine, capable of carrying out its assigned
missions in support of our nation’s interests and
goals. To achieve those ends, sustained human
performance should be the governing metric
from which to determine the correct numbers of
sailors needed to staff our ships, submarines, and
aircraft squadrons. However, ensuring that our
sailors are prepared to carry out their assign-
ments and duties in a sustained combat
environment will require changes to the Navy’s
culture: specifically, the implementation of pro-
grams focused on managing human performance
and fatigue levels.
TheMissionof theUSNavy
The US Navy is charged by law to staff its plat-
forms for sustained combat at sea. Specifically,
Title 10 of the United States Code, Subtitle C,
Part 1, Chapter 507, Article 5,062 states:
(a) The Navy, within the Department of the
Navy, includes, in general, naval combat and
service forces and such aviation as may be or-
ganic therein. The Navy shall be organized,
trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and
sustained combat incident to operations at sea. It
is responsible for the preparation of naval forces
necessary for the effective prosecution of war
except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance
with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the
expansion of the peacetime components of the
Navy to meet the needs of war.
It is the term ‘‘sustained combat’’ that is of pri-
mary interest in this paper. We believe it is
difficult, perhaps impossible, to achieve sus-
tained combat capability if sailors are incapable
of sustaining the level of performance required
by this statute. The phrase ‘‘sustained combat
incident to operations at sea for the effective
prosecution of war’’ is defined:
Operate offensively in a high density, multi-
threat environment. The most demanding oper-
ating environment anticipated is operations at
sea in wartime in cooperation with designed
joint/allied forces, including operations involving
coordination of land and sea-based aviation.
Peacetime forward operations in littoral areas
are almost equally demanding. These operations
are frequently characterized by confined and
congested water and air space occupied by
friends, adversaries and neutrals—making iden-
tification and coordination profoundly difficult.
In this environment, our adversaries can concen-
trate and layer their defenses. In an era when
even Third World countries possess sophisticated
weaponry, surprise attack can be anticipated by
submarines, coastal missiles, mines, sea-skim-
ming cruise missiles and theater ballistic missiles.
Additionally, afloat combatant platforms are to
be capable of performing all assigned primary
mission areas simultaneously, while maintaining
readiness Conditions I, II, and III (wartime/
forward deployment cruising readiness).
&Under Condition I, sailors can be expected to
perform for up to 24 hours.
&Under Condition II, the maximum expected
duration is 10 days, with a minimum of 4–6
hours of rest provided per man per day.
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&Under Condition III, the maximum expected
crew endurance is 60 days, with an opportu-
nity for 8 hours of rest provided per man per
day.
The operational requirements described above
indicate a need for sailors to be vigilant, respon-
sive, and adaptive—all traits a human possesses.
However, vigilance, responsiveness, and adapt-
ability are known to degrade in highly stressful
situations and while operating under significant
sleep deprivation, and the maritime operating
environment under combat conditions is char-




The operational requirements stated above
become part of several considerations in the
Navy’s afloat manpower requirements determi-
nation process. To meet these requirements, the
Navy uses an afloat manpower requirements
determination process centered on the Navy’s
standard productive workweek. The standard
productive workweek is an element of the
Navy’s standard workweek as described in
OPNAVINST 1000.16J and shown in Table 1.
As can be seen in the table, the standard pro-
ductive workweek in 2001 was 67 hours.
Also shown in Table 1, sailors are scheduled to
receive 56 hours of sleep per week, presumably
8 hours per day. Most experts agree that adult
humans require approximately 8 hours of sleep
per day. It is important to note that research has
overwhelmingly determined that the quantity,
the quality, and the timing of sleep are all critical
factors that must be considered when determin-
ing how long human performance can be
sustained. In other words, 8 hours of sleep dur-
ing daylight hours under disrupted conditions is
not equivalent to 8 hours of sleep at night under
ideal conditions.
In 2000–2001, the Center for Naval Analysis
(CNA), under contract to the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) N1, conducted a manpower
study of afloat units to determine the average
hours that sailors work at sea. The report was
entitled ‘‘Hours of Work at Sea: An Empirical
Analysis.’’ Before this 2001 study, the last time
the Navy conducted a workweek study was in
the 1970s. At the time of the CNA study, the
Navy’s standard workweek was reflected in the
data in Table 1. Researchers at the CNA collected
data from one vessel per class of surface ship that
was deployed to the Mediterranean Sea and In-
dian Ocean in 2000. Table 2 displays the weekly
average number of productive work hours per
sailor on those ships.
This effort revealed a discrepancy between
the actual hours sailors work and the Navy’s
productive workweek policy. The CNA study
reported an 8-hour discrepancy between the
Navy’s productive work policy of 67 hours per
week and the average hours (75.1 hours) the
sailors were reported to be working. It should
be noted that the shortest workweek reported
by the CNA study was 70.8 hours for sailors
on the LHD, while sailors on the CG averaged
TABLE 1: US Navy Standard Workweek
Circa 2001
Activity Hours per Week










TABLE 2: Productive Work Hours: Weekly Estimates from
Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) 2001 Study
Ship Class Watch1Ship’s Work Evolutions General Qtr Wkly Total
LHD 65.8 2.2 2.8 70.8
LSD 72.6 4.8 0 77.4
CVN 69.9 1.4 2.7 73.7
DDG 73.4 4.7 0 78.1
C 65.4 14.8 0 80.2
Average 69.5 4.0 1.6 75.1
CNA Study (2001).
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80.2 hours—a difference of almost 10 hours.
The study also strongly recommended the need
for further assessment of the workweek, calling
other issues into question as well. Additional
questions to be addressed included:
&Why was there such variation between plat-
forms? If this is real, does each platform have
a unique, productive workweek?
&Under those work and operating conditions,
was sailor performance acceptable?
&What is the workload variation within each
platform? Do all sailors on a given platform
work the same number of hours? Are there
differences between departments, divisions, or
work centers?
&Does the manpower requirements determina-
tion process account for the entire workload?
Does it include training and military require-
ments?
&Do staffing levels below billet requirements
lead to sailors working longer hours? If so,
what are the sailors sacrificing to cover the in-
creased workload?
Unfortunately, the CNA study had insufficient
data to draw conclusions on these questions.
However, one variable, sleep amount, can be
estimated from the report. As can be seen in
Table 3, the sailors in this study were getting
an average of 49.4 hours of sleep per week or
roughly 7 hours of sleep per day—an hour
less than the Navy’s Condition III guidance
of 8 hours per day. Sleep amount varied
by ship class, with the CG sailors getting
the least sleep (46.8 hours per week) and
LHD sailors reporting an average of
52.2 hours.
Three major drawbacks of the study, as cited by
the authors, were:
& Insufficient sample size. With only one ship
per class studied, there were not enough data
(reflected in Tables 1–3) to detect actual dif-
ferences that may have existed. With such
small sample sizes, it becomes impossible to
tease out the variance explained by factors
such as differing mission, the uniqueness of
the command, and/or the context of the cur-
rent geopolitical environment.
&Data stratification. It was not clear whether a
representative sample was collected for all cat-
egories of sailors. The study may not have
stratified or collected adequate numbers for
analyzing all pay grades, departments, divi-
sions, or work centers.
&Workload. Most importantly, the study did
not address the workload the sailors should/
would be performing while operating in a
wartime environment. The CNA study was
conducted in the Mediterranean Sea and Indi-
an Ocean while the fleet was deployed, but not
at war. Therefore, the study did not reflect the
work schedules associated with the operation-
al tempo during wartime.
Soon after the 2001 CNA study, the Navy
changed its Standard Navy Workweek by in-
creasing the Productive Work category from
67 to 70 hours and reducing Service Diversion
from 7 to 4 hours. As can be seen in Table 4,
the new Productive Work of 70 hours/week
became the Navy standard for use as the foun-
dation for all afloat manpower requirements.
While this change decreased the manpower re-
quirements per platform, it did not reduce the
total actual workload that still must be per-
formed for each ship.
The afloat manpower requirement represents
the number of humans required to optimally
operate a weapons system or other functions
required to keep the vessel operating.







LHD 3.4 52.2 11.7 21.8 89.1
LSD 1.6 48.5 10.8 20.1 81.0
CVN 2.5 49.8 9.6 18.6 80.5
DDG 2.1 47.8 7.7 19.3 76.9
CG 3.3 46.6 8.7 18.2 77.0
Average 2.6 49.4 9.6 19.4 81.0
Center for Naval Analysis Study (2001).
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Determining sailor performance as a function
of the manpower requirements determination
process has both qualitative and quantitative
elements. The quantitative aspects of sailor
performance are presumed to be associated
with the Standard Productive Workweek
(70 hours per week). However, this workload-
driven approach to requirements determination
does not reflect a Sailor’s ability to sustain
the required level of performance throughout
a wartime scenario. Research suggests that
sustainment of human performance is more
closely related to the amount and quality of
sleep than it is to the workload level alone.
In light of this information, we suggest that
these guiding principles are necessary for calcu-
lating the human part of the afloat staffing level
equation:
& Sailors (or the human capability embodied in
sailors) are an essential element of a warfare
system.
& Sailors represent the most important compo-
nent in a system; however, sailors may also
represent the most vulnerable system compo-
nent because they are unable to operate
continuously and are subject to fatigue.
&The sailor must be able to sustain a high level
of performance throughout the entire wartime
scenario.
MaintenanceRequirement forHumans
A weapons system can be divided into compo-
nent parts: mechanical, electrical/electronic,
and human elements are all components of
the system. Typically, the mechanical and elec-
trical/electronic components will receive
periodic preventative maintenance to keep
those parts of the system operating as designed.
The human element has periodic maintenance
requirements as well, including nourishment,
hygiene, and sleep. Failure to conduct these
basic maintenance requirements will result in
physical and mental deterioration of the
human body. Research clearly shows that
when humans experience sleep deficits,
their cognitive processes are significantly
reduced. Under reduced or restricted sleep
conditions, the following characteristics have
been observed:
&We do not think clearly;
&We become irritable;
&We do not communicate well with each other;
&We become withdrawn and less willing to re-
solve issues and problems;
&Our ability to ward off disease is impaired;
&We experience fatigue throughout our work
and leisure hours; and
&Our ability to carry out mental tasks is com-
promised.
Thus, when we do not get sufficient sleep, we
compromise our health and safety and the safety
of those around us.
Sleep inHumans
In normal humans, sleep occurs in roughly 90-
minute cycles that repeat over the course of an
8-hour primary sleep period (see Figure 1). Sleep
is categorized into two distinct classes known as
TABLE 4: Current Standard Navy
Workweek
Activity Hours per Week








Sunday free time 3
OPNAVINST (1000.16J CH-1).
Figure 1: Sleep
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nonrapid eye movement (NREM) sleep and rap-
id eye movement (REM) sleep. NREM can be
further divided into five sleep stages: Stage 0
(awake) and Stages 1–4, which correspond to
increasingly deeper sleep. Each stage depicted in
Figure 1 is necessary for and uniquely contrib-
utes to the human body’s restorative process.
Disruptions in any of these stages that lead to
full wakefulness lessens the sleep benefit to the
individual. Sleep deprivation can result from
frequent disruptions of the normal sleep cycle as
well as from foreshortened sleep periods.
The human need for sleep is a physiologically
driven event that dominates our daily activities
and is central to our ability to perform both
physical and cognitive tasks. The quantity and
quality of sleep, to a great extent, determine how
well humans function within a system. Much of
the variance in human performance is accounted
for by three underlying and well-documented
mechanisms that are integrally related to sleep:
&Human performance fluctuates based on fa-
tigue due to acute or chronic sleep deprivation.
Most adult humans require an average of
8 hours of sleep per day. Like many naturally
occurring processes, the requirement for sleep
is normally distributed, with some individuals
requiring more than 8 hours of sleep and some
individuals requiring less. When this sleep re-
quirement is not met, performance can suffer
dramatically.
& Substantial differences in performance are due
to normal circadian variation. The human cir-
cadian rhythm is a human’s natural daily cycle
and governs things such as hormone release
and alertness.
&A third source of performance variation re-
sults from disruption of circadian rhythms
from jet lag or shift work. Any traveler transi-
ting time zones, particularly traveling east,
will testify to the cognitive challenges posed
by jet lag. The literature on shiftwork is rife
with examples of diminished performance and
health risks associated with working night
shift and swing shift schedules. Both of these
conditions, diminished performance and
health risks, are partly due to disrupted circa-
dian rhythms or ‘‘circadian desynchrony.’’ A
comprehensive review of the effects of sleep
on performance in military operations is avail-
able in (Miller, Matasagas, and Shattuck in
press).
Impactof Insuf¢cient Sleep onHuman
Performance
Some aspects of performance are more suscepti-
ble to sleep deprivation than others. Given that
sleepiness causes increased eye blinks, longer eye
closure durations, even brief bursts of sleep
called ‘‘microsleep,’’ it is understandable that
tasks depending on visual input are particularly
sensitive to sleep disruption (Wickens et al.
2004). Studies have demonstrated that individu-
als whose jobs require them to perform vigilance
tasks (e.g., monitoring visual displays with little
or no external visual stimulation) tend to miss
subtle pattern changes. This vigilance decrement
has major implications for the Department of
Defense (DoD), given that individuals standing
watch in combat information, fire control, and
sonar stations may be required to monitor visual
or auditory displays for extended periods of time.
In addition to the DoD, the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) has also been interested in
the safety implications of sleep deprivation,
serving as a key player in developing strategies to
mitigate the effects of sleep deprivation in rail
mishaps. Joint funding from the DoD and FRA
has enabled the development of the Fatigue
Avoidance Scheduling Tool (FAST). This tool is
based on the Sleep and Fatigue Task Effective-
ness (SAFTE) model and uses an individual’s 72-
hour sleep history to predict current perfor-
mance level or ‘‘predicted effectiveness’’ (Hursh
et al. 2001).
Two groundbreaking studies demonstrate the
direct relationship between an individual’s per-
formance and the amount of sleep they receive.
One study, conducted at the Walter Reed Army
Institute of Research (WRAIR), looked at the
effects of 3, 5, 7, and 9 hours of sleep per night
(Belenky et al. 2003), while the other looked at
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4, 6, and 8 hours of sleep per night (Van Dongen
et al. 2003). In the WRAIR study, researchers
examined how varying sleep levels impacted hu-
man performance (Figure 2).
Baseline data were collected for 3 days on
all participants. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of the four sleep groups: 3, 5, 7,
and 9 hours of sleep per night. For 1 week fol-
lowing the baseline, participants received a
series of tests to evaluate their reaction times to a
visual stimulus. The results of this study showed
a dose–response relationship between amount of
sleep and human performance. The less sleep re-
ceived, the worse the performance. Quite
surprising to the researchers was the fact that
human performance remained below normal
levels for at least 3 days following participants’
return to normal 8 hours per night sleep condi-
tions. In addition, participants were unable to
accurately assess the level of degradation in their
performance, asserting that they have achieved
baseline levels when their performance was still
significantly degraded.
A closely related dose–response study of sleep
and performance examined 4, 6, and 8 hours of
sleep (Van Dongen et al. 2003). In their 2-week
experiment on 36 participants, time in bed was
held constant each day (no shiftwork schedul-
ing). Participants were given neurobehavioral
tests every 2 hours while awake. The results
showed that participants receiving progressively
less sleep have worse task performance than
those who receive more sleep. The group in the
4-hour time in bed condition exhibited the
greatest reduction in performance, while the
smallest performance reduction was seen in the
8-hour time in bed condition.
A second part of their experiment sought to
account for the differences between individual
sleep need and vulnerability to sleep loss.
A battery of tests was conducted on a separate
group of individuals to assess individual
variability on these two factors. The results
from both experiments concluded that the
estimated need for sleep was 8.2 hours per day,
with a variation of 2.6 hours. Thus, under
conditions of chronic sleep restriction, sleep
debt may be defined as the cumulative hours of
sleep loss with respect to the participant’s-
specific daily need for sleep. These results
indicate that some participants can function
well with less than 8 hours of sleep, while others
require significantly more sleep to retain their
normal level of performance.
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) conduct-
ed a study to examine how varying the sleep
allowance from 6 to 8 hours impacted academic
performance at the Recruit Training Command
(RTC) or Navy ‘‘Boot Camp’’ (Miller et al. 2004;
Andrews 2004). See Figure 3.
Academic data, in the form of standardized test
scores, were collected for 3 years of recruits,
representing cohorts from 2000, 2001, and
2003. (Data from 2002 were not included in the
current study because the sleep schedule was
changed in the middle of the year.)
Those who received 6 hours of sleep per night
(Year 2000 and 2001) had similar scores on
standardized tests (mean5 3.9). The 2003
cohort received 8 hours of sleep, an additional
2 hours per night. This 8-hours-per-night group
had significantly higher scores (mean5 4.5),
representing a 15.4%
Figure 2: Dose–response relationship between sleep and performance (Belenky
et al. 2003)
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improvement in performance. (Recruits who
did not finish training (attrites) were removed
from the analysis.) While other factors in the
training environment and regimen of these
US Navy recruits were also changed during
this time period, the striking improvement in
their standardized tests scores is in keeping
with research showing improved learning and
memory with additional sleep. This study
indicates that sleep is important to learning for
these young recruits.
In addition to simple sleep deprivation, the tim-
ing and quality of sleep play a significant role in
a human’s ability to sustain performance. Eight
hours of fragmented sleep per day, while better
than no sleep at all, is of lesser quality than con-
tiguous sleep. Additionally, napping can
improve human performance but is less effective
at restoring performance than contiguous, qual-
ity sleep (Godfrey 2006).
MaritimeStudies of HumanPerformance
and Sleep
Humans operate on an approximate 24-hour bi-
ological clock with a predictable pattern in many
parameters of our behavior. A proper apprecia-
tion of performance decrements, seen in
individuals whose circadian rhythms are desyn-
chronized, serves as a reminder of the
importance of adequate rest for all crew mem-
bers. Watchstanding schedules specifically
designed to safeguard against fatigue and pro-
mote sleep hygiene are vital.
Shiftwork is a persistent maritime issue due to
the requirements for full-time, around-the-clock
watchstanding. The traditional Naval watch ro-
tation schedule, 4 hours on watch and 8 hours
off watch, along with periodic requirement to
‘‘dog the watch,’’ results in sleep disruption due
to both fragmented recovery sleep and desyn-
chrony of the body’s circadian rhythm. Sailors
working the night shift are awake when their
bodies tell them they should be asleep and trying
to sleep when their internal clocks think they
should be awake. Research indicates that sailors
working the night shift, especially those exposed
to sunlight before trying to sleep, have trouble
getting quality sleep during daytime hours due to
this physiological sleep/wake conflict (Miller
and Nguyen 2003).
The US Coast Guard (USCG) has conducted a
number of human fatigue studies in the civilian
mariner domain as well as examined the
impact that USCG operations, especially the
4 hours on and 8 hours off watch rotation, has
on sailors’ ability to remain vigilant while
on duty.
One USCG study (Sandquist et al. 1996) sought
to identify the nature and extent of sleep disrup-
tion-induced fatigue in the commercial maritime
industry and identify the impact of watch dura-
tion on personnel fatigue. The study was
conducted on 141 mariners from eight commer-
cial ships (six tankers and two freighters). Data
were collected on their work and sleep patterns,
as well as a variety of other data pertinent to
fatigue. The incidence of critical fatigue indica-
tors such as severely restricted sleep duration per
24-hour period, rapid sleep onset at bedtime,
and critically low alertness levels suggests that
fatigue regularly occurs in this population. The
study concluded the following about the nature
and extent of the fatigue problem. Critical levels
of fatigue occur between 8% and 21% of the
time, driven primarily by personnel on the
4 hours on and 8 hours off watch schedule.
Recovery sleep periods do not occur. Mariners
sleep an average of 6.6 hours per 24-hour period
while on shipboard duty—1.3 hours less than




6 versus 8 hours of
sleep (Miller et al.
2004; Andrews
2004)
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their average sleep duration at home. Watch-
standers generally obtain less total sleep
(6.6 hours) than other personnel, and the sleep is
of a lower quality due to fragmentation and
physiologically inappropriate sleep times. The
study also found inconsistent levels of alertness
over the watchstanding period and a substantial
decline in alertness on the 20:00–24:00 hours
watch. Additionally, they found a significant de-
cline in alertness for the 04:00–08:00 hours
watch personnel and an overestimation of alert-
ness by 00:00–04:00 watch personnel. The study
concluded that a fatigue problem exists in the US
maritime industry. The research points to sleep
disruption, reduced time between watches, frag-
mented sleep, and long workdays as principal
contributors to the problem.
Another USCG study (Comperatore et al. 1999)
examined the incidence of sleep loss and wake-
fulness degradation under the USCG’s
EXEMPLAR crewing project. The EXEMPLAR
crewing project explored the potential use of re-
duced crew complements aboard high-
endurance cutters. One major concern is that re-
ductions in crew size may exacerbate crew
fatigue and ultimately compromise safety. The
central objective of this study was to determine
crew fatigue levels while sailing under EXEM-
PLAR crew reductions. This study was
conducted aboard the USCG Cutter MUNRO
during a patrol from Tokyo, Japan, to Pearl
Harbor, Hawaii. Daily evaluations of alertness
(maintenance of wakefulness) and of the stabil-
ity of the sleep/wake cycle (variability of sleep
duration and timing) were used to characterize
fatigue levels throughout 30 consecutive days on
patrol. Sleep (including sleep latency onset) was
assessed using ambulatory electro-encephoalo-
graphy (EEG) in 14 crew members. Forty-three
volunteers participated in the daily sleep evalua-
tions by wearing wrist-worn activity monitors.
The actigraphy data showed that 61.5% of all
scored sleep profiles exhibited severely disrupted
sleep patterns. The study also found that those
sailors who failed to maintain wakefulness also
experienced frequent sleep disruptions and typi-
cally received less than 6 hours of sleep per day.
Watch schedules requiring frequent rotations
from daytime to nighttime (24:00–04:00) and
early morning (04:00–08:00) duty hours con-
tributed to disruption of sleep/wake cycles.
Comperatore et al. (1999) conducted another
study aboard the USCG’s DEPENDABLE.
The study examined crew sleep and fatigue
during a 32-day transit from Portsmouth,
Virginia, to Halifax, Nova Scotia. Alertness
tests were administered within 3 hours of
awakening from daily sleep. The study showed
a 59% incidence of sleep/wake cycle disruption
associated with high failure rates in EEG alert-
ness tests. Twelve out of the 14 participants
failed to maintain wakefulness in 50–100% of
the tests.
These USCG studies were conducted while the
vessels were on independent transit and during
normal sea conditions. However, the analysis
concluded that crew endurance levels during
those low tempo operations were considered less
than optimal. If the study had been conducted
under more stressful operational tempo or dete-
riorating weather/sea conditions, an even
higher incidence of fatigue conditions would
be expected. The studies had the following four
recommendations:
& Implement crew endurance education pro-
grams to optimize underway crew rest and
prevent sleep disruption.
&Design watch schedules that minimize sleep/
wake cycle disruptions.
&Develop a system to optimize the number of
watch-qualified personnel underway to reduce
the frequency of rotations into the 24:00–
04:00 or 04:00–08:00 hours watch schedules.
& (EXEMPLAR Project only) Implement physi-
cal improvements to sleeping areas to improve
sleep quality.
Subsequent to these studies, the USCG initiated
a one in four watch rotation to address the issue
of fatigue in their watchstanders. They have as
instituted a ‘‘crew endurance management’’ pro-
gram throughout the entire service.
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SleepDisruptionDue toShiftwork
Sleep disruption occurs in many professions,
but perhaps none more so than in the maritime
domain. Sleep is disrupted as a result of
nighttime evolutions such as entering or
leaving port, underway replenishment, and
the normal watch rotations of key operating
stations. During Operation Enduring Freedom,
the Navy was required to conduct combat
operations around the clock. To accomplish
this mission, sister carriers shared 12-hour
shifts, one working days and one working
nights. The entire carrier shifted to a night
schedule to support this mission. Miller and
Nguyen (2003) conducted a study of sailor
sleep patterns on USS JOHN C. STENNIS
during Operation Enduring Freedom while
the carrier was working night operations.
The study, conducted on 28 participants,
measured the amount and quality of sleep via
wrist activity monitors (ActigraphTM).
The FAST was used to calculate predicted
effectiveness based on the data produced from
the ActigraphTM. The NPS study found
significant differences in sleep patterns
between those individuals working topside
and below decks (Table 5).
The study found tremendous differences in sleep
between individuals working topside and those
working below decks. It concluded that expo-
sure to sunlight immediately before bedtime
degraded the sleep of those individuals working
topside. Many below decks personnel do not
stand 4-on/8-off watches, instead performing
mainly maintenance responsibilities. A study
comparing flight deck personnel with non-flight
deck watchstanders might serve as a better
means of assessing the effects of light on the
sleep patterns of sailors working night opera-
tions and exposed to daylight immediately
before bedtime.
SailorPerformanceWhile Fatigued
These maritime studies clearly identify a direct
correlation between shiftwork, sleep disrup-
tions, and degraded human performance. The
preceding studies were conducted under normal
independent underway operating conditions
(i.e., less than arduous conditions), yet they
found severely disrupted sleep patterns. Under
combat conditions, it is reasonable to assume
that sleep will be even more degraded. The abil-
ity of sailors to think and reason while in a
fatigued state has significant implications for
combat effectiveness. The combat environment
adds a much higher level of stress than normal
deployed maritime operations. Managing cogni-
tive fatigue has a large role in improving a
sailor’s endurance in a high operational tempo
and high stress combat environment.
Navy’sWartimeEnvironment
In a wartime situation, ships routinely and fre-
quently cycle from readiness Condition III to
Condition II to Condition I as frequently, as the
fluid nature of war demands flexible readiness
responses to meet the changing threat scenarios.
The example from which we might draw some
parallels is the British/Argentinean war over the
Falkland Islands. The British Navy had to con-
tend with a credible air threat posed by the
Argentinean Mirage jets carrying the Exocet
cruise missile. The Argentinean Navy possessed
a low-risk, subsurface threat from their one ser-
viceable diesel submarine. That lone threat
resulted in the British Navy expending an inor-
dinate amount of time and resources to
prosecute the contact, both real and false.
Likely most, if not all, of those prosecutions
TABLE 5: Average Sleep and Effectiveness Topside versus Below Decks Personnel
Average Daily Sleep (hours) Average Sleep per Episode (hours) % Time 78% Cognitive Effectiveness
Topside 4.72 3.29 66
Below decks 7.35 6.83 35
Miller and Nguyen (2003).
Seventy-eight percent effectiveness equates to a blood alcohol concentration of 0.05. The USAF uses this as a cut off for all flights.
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were conducted with their ships at a higher state
of readiness (Condition I or II) vice the normal
wartime Condition III. Each move to a higher
battle condition results in the off-watch Sailors
losing what little sleep they were receiving and
thus becoming that much more ineffective as an
integral part of the system designed to prosecute
or defend the unit. In a forward-deployed state,
the ships will also be participating in refueling at
sea evolutions (approximately every 3 days)
and replenishing stores (approximately every
7 days). Each of those evolutions constitutes a
lost sleep episode.
Under a Falkland Islands-type scenario, the
US Navy should expect to frequently cycle
into increased readiness postures. Thus,
sailors will be expected to remain vigilant
for unreasonably long periods of time. In such
a scenario, sailors may give everything they
have to give for the mission, but due to human
physiology and as a result of fatigue brought
on by sleep disruption, their best may not be
good enough. The end result of a flotilla of
sailors holding key operational positions,




If the Navy is tasked to staff its platforms for
sustained combat operations at sea, and if such
operations are as arduous and long as those stat-
ed in our governing documents, then sustained
human performance must be the foundation
from which we staff those platforms. If sustained
human performance is to become the governing
metric, then one should expect the afloat man-
power requirements necessary to support
continuous combat operations at sea to increase
and possibly increase significantly. Recent efforts
by the commercial maritime industry regarding
work hours within their Standards of Training,
Certification, and Watch-keeping (STCW)
regulations and the Federal Motor Carriers
Safety Administration’s (FMCSA) revision of
their work-hour regulations show that sleep
and time of day are as important as ‘‘how long’’
people work when it comes to readiness and
safety.
Both of these organizations imposed minimum
continuous sleep-length requirements and
maximum work limits per 24-hour periods.
While most manning analyses take into consid-
eration time for sleep, they do not consider the
fact that sleep should occur in one uninterrupted
period of at least 8 hours. In order to guarantee
this continuous 8-hour period for sleep, one
would need to provide at least 9–10 hours of free
time so that members could attend to non-
work issues (e.g., eating, laundry, correspon-
dence, etc.) and prepare themselves for the sleep
period. Most manning assessments do not allow
for that level of specificity and while these as-
sessments provide the necessary 8 hours for
sleep, the sleep may be taken in multiple epi-
sodes. Fragmenting the 8 hours into two or more




The Navy’s conundrum is to decide what defini-
tion of war to use for manpower requirements
determination and the readiness-reporting
guidelines. Congressional guidance tells the
Navy to staff the fleet for sustained combat at
sea. The Navy has defined the combat opera-
tional environment to be 60 days, threat
probable in a three-axis threat environment (air,
surface, and subsurface threats). If we staff plat-
forms for a wartime scenario, then we are
funding more manpower than we need to meet
current and near-term future naval engagements.
However, if we lower the baseline requirement
assessment based on our most recent Navy war-
fighting experience, we have no demand signal
to justify increasing the staffing level if the
changing political landscape leads us back to the
60-day threat probable scenario. In that scenar-
io, we would be forced to send ships into harm’s
way, inadequately staffed to meet the threat.
Under these conditions, unless we achieve a
quick and decisive victory with our technology,
we will be in a vulnerable position. The M11
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metric was used to reflect the Navy’s wartime
manning requirement. Because we did not staff
the platforms to that requirement, the Navy de-
veloped mobilization plans to bring the reserve
Sailors onboard to make up the difference.
However, as time passed, the M11 term took on
the meaning of an inflated requirement. The
problem is that there is no empirical evidence
based on research to suggest that the wartime
manpower requirement (reflected in the M11
metric) was wrong. Unfortunately, if the war-
time scenario is accurately stated, then human
performance may be the deciding factor in vic-
tory or defeat.
Recommendations
It is clear that the Navy is moving toward devel-
oping platforms that require a much smaller
human footprint. Based on the research avail-
able, sleep-related fatigue is the limiting factor in
sustaining combat at sea. As such, this limitation
represents a major flaw in the Navy’s afloat
workload staffing methodology because it holds
the workload as the hard constraint, failing to
consider human preventative maintenance re-
quirements. This construct rewards manpower
planners for finding ways to leverage more pro-
ductive work from sailors, while placing sailors’
rest, nourishment, and hygiene at risk. Regard-
less of how the Navy may define future combat
at sea, the workload construct misses the mark
with respect to deploying platforms that can de-
liver sustained combat capability. To deliver
sustained combat capability, the Navy must
make human performance the controlling factor
for determining personnel staffing levels and use
minimal staffing constructs to optimize sailors’
productive time after accounting for their per-
sonal needs. Making sailors’ physiological
requirements (sleep, nourishment, and hygiene)
a primary constraint in the afloat manpower
requirements determination methodology will
lead to staffing numbers that support sustained
combat capability. To account for sailors’ sleep
requirement, the Navy must address total sleep
hours, sleep desynchrony, and sleep fragmenta-
tion. These needs can be accomplished through
slight modifications to the Navy’s standard
workweek, changes to the Navy’s culture, and
modifications to berthing. Doing so will go a
long way toward ensuring that sailors receive the
high-quality sleep that they need to deliver sus-
tained combat capability.
One step is to adjust the Navy’s workweek to
allow for 9 hours vice 8 hours of sleep per day.
Taking this action reduces the Navy’s productive
workweek by 7 hours per week, as identified in
Table 6. The 7-hour reduction in the productive
workweek will increase afloat staffing by some
number, but that number will reflect the true re-
quirement for a human to sustain combat
capability beyond a couple of days. A change is
needed in US Navy culture with respect to
smarter watch rotations and increasing the Con-
dition III watch sections from three to four.
These actions would provide a consistent work
schedule that would eliminate the normal alert-
ness troughs that humans exhibit, associated
with the circadian rhythm, and thus significantly
improve Sailor endurance and alertness. Table 7
depicts a 4-section, 3-hour watch rotation. Note
that each section stands the same watch each day
and that the nine hours between watches afford
the Sailor the ability to achieve eight hours of
continual sleep. Because the quality of sleep is
equally as important as total hours and desyn-
chrony, sleep fragmentation reduces the quality
of one’s sleep and promotes Sailor fatigue.
Eliminating sleep disruptions in berthing areas
(e.g., ringing ‘‘Bells,’’ passing the word, daily
berthing inspections when sailors are sleeping,
TABLE 6: Comparison of Current versus
Proposed Navy Standard Workweek
Activity Current Proposed
On duty 81 74
Productive work 70 63
Training 7 7





Sunday free time 3 3
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reducing ambient light, noise from machinery
adjacent to berthing locations, and proper air
quality [temperature, humidity, and airflow])
will result in higher quality sleep.
The Navy should expand its investment in hu-
man systems integration, focusing on human
performance as a critical component of total
system performance. Thereby, we will ensure
that future platforms have fully integrated the
human strengths and weaknesses into the system
design. Such actions will lead to the right answer,
resulting in optimal use of scarce human re-
sources. The Navy needs a better understanding
of the consequences of these manning decisions
if we are to deliver the level of combat capability
required to protect our national interests
abroad.
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